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The primary function of rights (permits) is to guide incentives to achieve internal-izat ion of external i t ies (see Coase [ I 9 6 0 ] , Demsetz [1976] , and H a h n 
[1994]). In the past decade different kinds of 
rights have been introduced by national or supra-
national governments. The most well-known are: 
lead rights, S 0 2 rights, and chlorofluorocarbon 
rights introduced by the U.S. government (all 
examples of environmental rights), and the milk 
and fishery rights introduced by the European 
Union and the government of Canada (both 
examples of production rights). 
Most cash markets for rights have not yet 
been well-structured or developed (Pennings, 
Heijman, and Meulenberg [1997]). Because of 
fluctuations in prices of these rights in the cash 
market, firms are faced with a price risk. A 
futures market would enable them to hedge 
against this price risk. 
The U.S. has taken the first steps toward 
developing a structured cash market and a futures 
market (see Sandor [1991] and Hahn [1994]). 
This article shows that the nature of rights and the 
fact that rights are linked to the product ion 
process mean that rights futures offer good possi-
bilities for hedging. 
A FUTURES M A R K E T FOR R I G H T S 
In a futures market, transactions relating to 
commodity characteristics, time of delivery, deliv-
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ery location, and unit of trading are standardized 
(Sandor [1973]). This standardization process for 
commodities can be very complicated, especially 
with respect to place of delivery and commodity 
characteristics (such as the basic deliverable grade). 
This is in contrast to the futures market for rights. 
A right is a perfect homogeneous "com-
modity," i.e., the underlying commodity is identi-
cal to the c o m m o d i t y in the cash market , 
implying that there are no problems with delivery. 
Place of delivery is not important either, because 
delivery takes place by transferring book entries 
between accounts (Pennings, Meulenberg, and 
Heijman [1996]). 
Rights futures contracts have no residual 
risk (i.e., basis risk) at maturity of the futures 
contract (see Black [1986]), and therefore hedging 
is more effective (see Caste l ino [1992] and 
Pirrong, Kormendi, and Meguire [1994]). Because 
price convergence is assured, there is never an 
instance when spot prices move one way while 
the futures settlement price moves another. 
These characteristics of rights futures have a 
positive impact on the minimum-variance hedge 
ratio. The risk-minimizing or minimum-variance 
hedge ratio is equal to the covariance between the 
change in the spot price and the change in the 
futures price, divided by the variance in the 
change in the futures price (see Ederington [1979] 
and Paroush and Wolf [1989]). 
N" = -
COV(AS t,AF t) 
VAR(AF t) (1) 
where N* is the minimum-variance hedge ratio, 
COV is the covariance, ASt is the change in the 
spot price, AFt is the change in the futures price, 
and VAR is the variance. 
Given the characteristics of rights, the price 
change in the spot price of rights is almost equal 
to the price change in futures, which results in a 
minimum-variance hedge ratio close to N* = - 1 . 
The optimum hedge quantity should be very near 
the full production level. 
For the viability of such a market, it is not 
only of interest that rights themselves are hedged 
effectively, as is shown by Equation (1), but also 
that rights futures lend themselves to cross-hedg-
ing the profit capacity of a complicated produc-
tion process. In theory, firms creating externalities, 
and thereby being affected by rights, will purchase 
or sell rights depending on their initial cost struc-
ture, up to the net benefit (see Tietenberg [1985] 
andVarian [1990]). 
What does the price of a right indicate? 
Consider a competitive industry affected by envi-
ronmental rights, i.e., a firm is only allowed to 
produce when it has environmental rights.1 Note 
that the total rights allocated by the government 
are fixed. So: 





where Q are the units of output, N is the total 
amount of firms, R ; are the units of environmental 
rights used by firm i, and RQ are the total amounts 
of rights allocated by the government. 
For simplicity, assume that a firm needs one 
environmental right in order to produce one unit 
of output, i.e., a = l . 2 Assume further that a 
competitive industry produces a homogeneous 
product such as electricity, so that the only barrier 
to entering the industry is the fact that environ-
mental rights are needed for production, i.e., the 
only limited factor is the environmental rights. 
The fact that the rights are the only limited 
factor implies that the price of rights can be seen as 
an economic rent. The economic rent generated in 
the production process is allocated to the rights. 
Whenever there is some fixed factor, in this case the 
rights, that prevents one from entering the industry, 
there will be an equilibrium rental rate for that 
factor. Even with a fixed amount of allocated rights, 
it is always possible to enter the industry by buying 
the position of a firm currendy in the industry, i.e., 
buying environmental rights. The competition for 
rights among potential entrants forces up the prices 
to the point when the net benefit of producing 
equals the price of rights (see Varian [1990] and 
Pennings and Meulenberg [1996]). 
The value of the rights at industry level can 
be expressed as: 
P R R 0 PR 0 -C(R 0 ) (2) 
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where P R is the price of rights, P is the price of the 
output, and C are the costs of production excluding 
those of buying the rights. The cost concept used 
in Equation (2) is broad, i.e., these costs include the 
reward for the production of means (capital and 
labor) and capital reserves in order for the firm to 
continue research and development, etc. 
Equation (2) shows that the price of rights 
reflects the possibilities of marketing the output 
(i.e., the output price), and the cost structure of 
the production process (excluding the costs of 
rights). Hence, the price of rights is a proxy for 
the performance of the industry. If the price of 
rights is high, the industry is performing well and 
is therefore willing to pay a high price for the 
right, and vice versa. 
Assuming that the profitability of individual 
firms is closely related to that of the industry, the 
firm now has the opportuni ty to use a single 
(rights) futures contract to hedge against adverse 
revenue in the industry in which it operates, 
regardless of the complexity of the production 
process, instead of using a compl ica ted and 
perhaps non-existent futures contract spread. So 
futures rights are not only an efficient tool for 
hedging against adverse fluctuations in prices of 
rights, but also for hedging against adverse fluctua-
tions in the profit capacity of the production 
process. This cross-hedge is effective if the 
comovement of the performance of the industry 
and futures of rights is reliable and consistent (see 
Anderson and Danthine [1981], Black [1986], and 
Ames and Myneni [1992]). 
Some futures exchanges are already plan-
ning to introduce futures contracts for rights 
because their specific characteristics make them 
very suitable for futures trading, as has been 
outlined here. Recently, the Chicago Board of 
Trade took the first concrete steps toward such a 
market when it, with the cooperation of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, conducted an 
auction for S 0 2 rights. This organized spot and 
forward market is viewed as a logical first step 
toward full futures trading. 
C O N C L U S I O N S 
More and more firms are being affected by 
rights introduced by governments to internalize 
externalities. Rights form a production cost that 
has an impact on a firm's profit. Because of price 
fluctuations, they create an additional risk for the 
firm; rights futures will therefore meet the firms' 
needs for hedging. 
This article shows that the characteristics of 
rights make them very suitable for futures trading. 
The possibilities of using rights for one's own 
hedging and cross-hedging mean that they are of 
interest to both the futures industry and the firms 
affected by rights. 
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'The same holds for production rights. 
-Relaxing this assumption will not change the 
conclusions of the analysis. 
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